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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mariano Perez, Jr., appeals in these consolidated cases from the 
judgment of dismissal entered upon the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petitions for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In February 2005, Perez threatened his ex-girlfriend and three other 
individuals with a loaded handgun. State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 385, 179 
P.3d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 2008). Three days later, he shot a police officer four 
times at point-blank range. & The state charged him in one case with three 
counts of aggravated assault, one count of felony injury to child, and one count 
of unlawful possession of a firearm, and in a separate case with aggravated 
battery on a law enforcement officer, felony eluding, and unlawful possession of 
a firearm. kl The state also alleged persistent violator enhancements in both 
cases. kl The cases were consolidated for plea and sentencing and, pursuant 
to a plea agreement, Perez pied guilty to one count of aggravated assault and to 
aggravated battery on a police officer and admitted the persistent violator 
allegations. ill In exchange, the remaining charges were dismissed. & The 
district court imposed concurrent fixed life sentences. & The judgments and 
sentences were affirmed on appeal. & at 388-89, 179 P.3d at 351-52. 
Perez filed timely pro se petitions for post-conviction relief, and affidavits 
in support thereof, alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel in both 
of the underlying criminal cases. (R., Vol. I, pp.2-8, 54-60.) Following the 
1 
appointment of post-conviction counsel (R., Vol. I, pp.16, 68), Perez filed an 
amended petition, again alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 
counsel (R., Vol. I, pp.83-87). 1 Specifically, as it relates to the issue on appeal, 
the amended petition alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for "Utiliz[ing] 
coercive conditions of pre-trial detention to force Petitioner to enter pleas of 
guilty." (R., Vol. I, p.84.) 
The state answered the amended petition and moved to dismiss it (R., 
Vol. I, pp.88-90; R., Vol. 11, pp.102-267). The district court took judicial notice of 
the records and transcripts in Perez's underlying criminals cases (R., Vol. I, 
pp.24, 31) and dismissed Perez's amended petition in its entirety, finding that 
Perez had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of 
his post-conviction claims (R., Vol. I, pp.24-40). The court entered a judgment of 
dismissal (R., Vol. I, pp.41-42), from which Perez timely appealed (R., Vol. I, 
pp.43-46). 
1 It appears Perez filed only a single amended petition, the substance of which 
embraced both underlying criminal cases, but the caption of which listed only a 
single case number. (R., Vol. I, pp.83-87; see also R., Vol. I, pp.1, 52-53 
(registers of actions in Canyon County case numbers CV-2009-5678 and CV-
2009-5679).) The district court treated the amended petition as having been 
filed in both post-conviction cases and disposed of the claims therein in a single 
order bearing both post-conviction case numbers. (R., Vol. I, pp.24-40; see also 
R., Vol. I, pp.41-42 (Judgment of Dismissal bearing both case numbers).) 
2 
ISSUE 
Perez states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Bank's 
[sic] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 




Perez Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Post-
Conviction Petition 
A Introduction 
Perez challenges the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition, 
contending he raised a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an 
evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly 
coercing his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.3-6.) Perez's argument fails. A 
review of the record and the applicable law supports the district court's 
determination that Perez failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact entitling 
him to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Perez Failed To Establish A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact With Respect 
To His Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claim 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
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676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction 
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain 
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and 
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. ~ (citing I.C. § 19-
4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); 
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject 
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's 
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), 
(c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
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evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. ~ (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." ~ 
As is relevant to this appeal, Perez's amended petition alleged that trial 
counsel was ineffective for allegedly coercing Perez's guilty pleas. (R., Vol. I, 
p.84.) To overcome summary dismissal of this claim, Perez was required to 
demonstrate that "(1) a material issue of fact exist[ed] as to whether counsel's 
performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of fact exist[ed] as to 
whether the deficiency prejudiced [Perez's] case." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 
148, 153-54, 177 P .3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a petitioner alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance and 
resulting prejudice). To establish deficient performance, the burden was on 
Perez to show that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 
(1998). To establish prejudice, Perez was required to show that, but for 
counsel's errors, he would not have pied guilty and would have insisted on going 
to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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Applying the foregoing principles to the record before it, the district court 
concluded that Perez failed to establish an issue of material fact entitling him to 
an evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly 
using coercive conditions of pretrial confinement to force Perez to plead guilty. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.33-38.) In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the 
allegations in Perez's amended petition and accompanying affidavit with the 
record of the underlying criminal proceedings, including Perez's statements, 
made under oath, at the guilty plea hearing. (Id.) Ultimately, the court 
determined that Perez's "contentions about his detention conditions were 
conclusory" and that his allegations that his attorney used those conditions to 
force his guilty pleas were disproved by Perez's own statements during the plea 
colloquy, which were summarized by the district court as follows: 
Petitioner Perez, in open court, stated that he was satisfied with his 
attorney's performance and that he was not pressured, coerced, or 
threatened in any way to accept the plea negotiation, which 
involved the dismissal of numerous felonies and potential 
sentencing enhancements. In fact, Perez told the court that he was 
pleading guilty because the charges were true; that no one was 
forcing him to plead guilty; that he [had] adequate time to talk to his 
attorney about the charges; that his attorney had done all the 
things that he would have expected her to do in representing him; 
he stated that there were not things that [his attorney] had failed to 
do that he had wanted her to do. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.37-38.) The district court's determination is supported by the 
record (see R., Vol. I, pp.233-38 (transcript of guilty plea hearing)) and the 
applicable law, and the state adopts it as its argument on appeal. For this 
Court's convenience, a copy of the district court's order is attached to this brief 
as Appendix A 
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On appeal, Perez does not dispute that the record of the underlying 
criminal proceedings, particularly the record of the guilty plea hearing, is 
inconsistent with his post-conviction claim that trial counsel used coercive 
conditions of pretrial confinement to force Perez to enter his guilty pleas. (See 
generally Appellant's brief, pp.3-6.) Rather, his sole contention on appeal 
appears to be that the district court was required to accept as true the "facts" 
alleged in his verified petition and affidavit, including the "factual contention" that 
"his plea was not truly voluntary because he was being housed in inhuman [sic] 
conditions, then when he was placed in better conditions and wanted to reject a 
plea agreement, his attorney got mad at him and told him he would be going 
back to the poor living conditions." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) According to Perez, 
these factual contentions were sufficient, by themselves, to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. (Id.) Perez is incorrect. 
Like any other civil litigant attempting to avoid an adverse summary 
judgment ruling, a post-conviction petitioner does not raise a genuine issue of 
fact by merely contradicting in an affidavit what he told the court, under oath, in a 
plea hearing. See Frazier v. J.R. Simplot Co., 136 Idaho 100, 103, 29 P.3d 936, 
939 (2001) (citation omitted) (impermissible to attempt to prevent an adverse 
summary judgment ruling by creating factual issues in an affidavit which 
contradict prior sworn deposition statements); Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 
Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 427, 435 (Ct. App. 1994) (a "sham" affidavit that 
directly contradicts previous testimony may be disregarded on a summary 
judgment motion). Because the allegations in Perez's affidavit were affirmatively 
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disproved by his prior sworn statements at the change of plea hearing, they did 
not create a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (post-conviction allegations 
insufficient for granting of relief when they are clearly disproved by the record); 
Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622, 630 (Ct. App. 1996) (same). 
Perez has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the district court's order summarily dismissing Perez's petitions for post-
conviction relief. 
DATED this 22nd day of August 2012. 
I A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney Gener 
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CASE NO. CV -2009-5679 
.,1Jl¥:t.2DD9iS6"/·8,, 
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
This matter having come before the couit on June 8, 2010, upon the Respondent State of 
Idaho's Motion for Summary Dismissal, filed April 16, 201 O; and the Petitioner having been 
represented by Mr. Aaron Bazzoli, Assistant Canyon County Public Defender; and the 
Respondent having been represented by Mr. Bryan Taylor; and the comt having considered the 
file and record in this action, the file and record in Case No. CR-2005-6559 and CR-2005-3932, 
the arguments of counsel, together with the applicable law; and this cou1t having orally granted 
the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on June 8, 201 O; and no written order having 
subsequently been filed; this court does hereby enter its written order as follows. 
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BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Mariano Perez Jr. filed his pro se Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction 
Relief in this matter on May 19, 2009, alleging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his 
underlying criminal cases, Case No. CR-2005-6559 and CR-2005-3932. On July 22, 2009, the 
court filed its Notice of Intent to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief based on what 
appeared to be the untimeliness of the Petition. On October 8, 2009, counsel for Petitioner filed 
a Supplemental Response to Notice oflntent to Dismiss, clarifying that Perez had filed a Petition 
for Review before the Idaho Supreme Court following the decision by the Court of Appeals. A 
copy of the Order Denying Petition for Review by the Idaho Supreme Court dated July 31, 2008, 
is reflected and demonstrates that the "Remittiturs" filed in Canyon County Case Nos. CR-2005-
3932 and CR-2005-6559 on March 27, 2008, do not accurately reflect the conclusion of the 
cases. 
A Status Conference was conducted on February 19, 2010, attended by counsel for the 
Petitioner and for the State. The court agreed with Petitioner that his May 19, 2009, filing in this 
case was timely, based on the Supplemental Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss that was 
filed in this action on October 8, 2009. Counsel for Petitioner further advised the court that he 
believed the decisions of the Court of Appeals in the underlying criminal cases resolved the 
issues raised by Petitioner's prose filing, b~t that he intended to file an Amended Petition. 
Counsel for the State stipulated to the filing of an Amended Petition. 
Petitioner Mariano Perez Jr, 's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed on 
March 15, 2010 in Case No. CV-2009-5679. 1 In that Amended Petition he raises claims arising 
1 Petitioner's post-conviction pleadings were originally given two separate case numbers, CV-2009-5678 and CV-
20009-5679. After July 22, 2009, counsel have filed all pleadings relating to both underlying criminal actions (CR-
2005-3932 and CR-2005-6559) in Case No. CV-2009-5679 only, but the court will treat the pleadings as having 
been filed in both CV-2009-5679 and CV-2009-5678 since they address both underlying criminal cases. 
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( 
from two separate cases: CR-2005-6559 (Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement Officer and 
Persistent Violator); and CR-2005-3932 (Aggravated Assault and Persistent Violator). The 
specific claims are as follows, with regard to both cases: 
( a) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the trial court level; 
(b) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the appellate level; and 
( c) Cruel, inhuman and coercive conditions of confinement prior to sentencing. 
Petitioner's specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are as follows: 
(a) Failure to investigate Petitioner's fitness to stand trial, evaluate plea options, plead 
guilty and be sentenced; 
(b) Failure to advocate for adequate pre-trial conditions of detention; 
(c) Utilization of coercive conditions of pre-trial detention to force Petitioner to enter 
pleas of guilty; and 
(d) Failure to research and present arguments on appeal as directed by Petitioner; 
The Amended Petition was not verified. However, on March 19, 2010, the Petitioner caused to 
be filed a Verification, wherein Petitioner Perez indicated that he had reviewed the Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and believed that the factual statements contained in that 
Amended Petition "are true and genuine based on good information and belie£" 
The State filed its Answer on March 29, 2010. On that same date, the State filed its 
Motion for Summary Dismissal based on the alleged lack of timeliness of the filing of the 
petition in this case. At a Status Conference on April 12, 2010, the State moved to withdraw the 
Motion for Summary Dismissal based on timeliness. However, the State indicated its intention 
to file another Motion for Summary Dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c), since 
000026 
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( 
the State believed that the pleadings, answers and admissions had not raised a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
The State filed a Motion for Summar):' Dismissal on April 16, 2010, together with a Brief 
in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal. The State contends that Petitioner's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding both the 
deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Further, the State contends that Petitioner's claim 
of cruel, inhuman and coercive conditions of confinement prior to sentencing fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. 
Specifically, the State argues that Petitioner Perez has failed to establish that counsel's 
perfo1mance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and, even if it did, has failed to 
establish how that resulted in prejudice. Further, the State argues that the Petitioner has 
presented mere conclusory allegations and that the Petitioner's submissions are insufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact. By an order filed April 22, 2010, the State's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal was scheduled for hearing on June 8, 2010. Argument was presented and 
the court granted the State's Motion for Swnmary Dismissal. No final order was prepared, and 
this written mling follows. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature, 
State vs. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,678,662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 
830,452, 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,921,828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (App. 1992). 
However, it differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action because the application must 
contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be 
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verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, 
records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must 
state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. LC. § 19-4903. Thus, 
the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations> or the application will be subject to dismissal. A verified pleading that sets forth 
evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an 
affidavit, and is accorded the same probative force as an affidavit. Camp v. Jimenez, 107 Idaho 
878,693 P.2d 1080 (Ct.App.1984). 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. 
Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to LC, § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. 
Summary judgment will be granted in a civil action when the litigant opposing the 
motion fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 
101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988); Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771,774,828 P.2d 334,337 
(Ct.App.1992). As stated in Garzee: 
Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish 
a prima facie case. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue of material 
fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 
Garzee, 121 Idaho at 774, 828 P.2d at 337. This same standard governs motions for summary 
dismissal of applications for post-conviction relief. If the applicant facing such a motion fails to 
present evidence making a prima facie case, i.e., establishing each essential element of the claim, 
then summary dismissal is appropriate. The ·applicant's factual showing must be based upon 
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evidence that would be admissible at hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P .2d 
546, 551 (Ct.App.1982). Thus, an applicant for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Like a civil litigant 
resisting a motion for summary judgment, an applicant opposing summary dismissal under I.C. § 
19-4906 must present evidence to supp01t every controverted element of the claim for relief 
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 3 71, 825 P .2d 94 (Ct.App.1992). If the applicant fails to present 
evidence establishing an essential element on which he or she bears the burden of proof, 
summary dismissal is appropriate. 
The Sixth Amendment right to representation by counsel includes the right to be 
represented by reasonably competent counsel in an adequate fashion, Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668,685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 
758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988); Huck v. Stale, 124 Idaho 155,857 P.2d 634 (1993). An accused is 
entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of a diligent, conscientious advocate, State v. 
Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8, 539 P.2d 556, 560 (1975). 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-
conviction procedure action. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 
petitioner must show that the attomey's performance was deficient, and that the petitioner was 
prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Hassett v. Stale, 127 Idaho 313,316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 
(Ct.App.1995). 
To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attomey's 
representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 
104 S.Ct. at 2064; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988). 
000029 
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To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 
attomey's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial (or proceeding) would have been 
different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656, 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
There is a strong presumption that defense counsel's performance falls within the wide 
range of competent professional assistance, and the defendant bears the burden of proving that 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,922,828 P.2d 
1323, 1327 (Ct.App.1992). Second, the defendant must show there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, ·the results of the proceeding would have been 
different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Parrott, 117 Idaho at 274-75, 787 P.2d 
at 260-61. This latter "prejudice" requirement focuses on whether counsel's deficient 
performance affected the outcome of the case. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 
370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). To avoid summary dismissal, a post-conviction claim must 
sufficiently allege facts under both prongs of the test. 
Trial tactics and strategy choices are the province of tiial counsel and will not be deemed 
deficient in the absence of evidence that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the law or other objectively ascertainable sho1tcomings. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 
155,857 P.2d 634 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,469,816 P.2d 1023, 1026 
(Ct.App.1991 ). 
Rule 201(c), Idaho Rules of Evidence, provides that "A court may take judicial notice, 
whether requested or not. When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts 
000030 
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
7 
from the court file in the same or a separate case, the comt shall identify the specific documents 
or items that were so noticed (emphasis supplied)." Rule 20l(d), I.R.E., provides when the court 
must take judicial notice: "When a party makes an oral or written request that a court take 
judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the comt file in the same or a separate 
case, the pa1ty shall identify the specific documents or items for which the judicial notice is 
requested or shall proffer to the court and serve on all pruties copies of such documents or items. 
A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary 
infonnation." The Respondent State ofldaho has asked the court to take judicial notice of the 
record, transcripts and exhibits in the underlying criminal cases, Case Nos. CR-2005-3932 and 
CR-2005-6559, State of Idaho v. Mariano Perez Jr. 
A petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
will survive a motion for summaiy dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of 
fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact 
exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d 
at 833. In ruling on a motion for summary dismissal, the court must review the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Petitioner and must determine whether the facts would entitle Petition to 
relief if accepted as true. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995). 
However, the court is not required to accept either an applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159,715 
P.2d 369, 372 (Ct.App.1986). Post-conviction relief proceedings are not substitutes for appeals, 
and applicants for post-conviction relief are not allowed to raise issues in post-conviction 
proceedings that could have been raised on direct appeal unless the issues were know known and 
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could not reasonably have been known during the direct appeal. Section 19-490 I (b ), Idaho 
Code; Hollon vs. State, 132 Idaho 573,581,976 P.2d 927,935 (1999); Raudebaugh v. State, 
1365 Idaho 602, 21 P.3d 924 (2001). 
ANALYSIS 
Failure to Investigate Petitioner's Fitness to Stand Trial, to Evaluate Plea Options, to 
Plead Guilty, and to be Sentenced 
A review of the record reflects that Petitioner Perez has offered purely conclusory 
statements with regard to these claims. He has not presented any evidence, admissible at an 
evidentiary hearing, nor articulated any facts in supp01t of a claim that he was not fit to stand 
trial; that he was not fit to evaluate plea options; that he was not fit or competent to plead guilty; 
or that he was not fit or competent to be sentenced. Both at the time of his change of plea on 
September 13, 2005, and at the time of his sentencing on March 31, 2006, Perez's statements and 
demeanor demonstrated ample awareness and understanding of the proceedings. 
The court had ordered a psychological evaluation of Petitioner Perez, together with a Pre-
Sentence Investigation rep011. The comt also specifically advised Perez of his right to the 
assistance and advice of counsel. The court-ordered psychological evaluation was conducted by 
Dr. Craig Beaver, a licensed psychologist who maintained a private practice and also served as 
director of neuropsychological services at the Elks Rehabilitation Hospital in Boise. Dr. Beaver 
had the opportunity to review Perez's prior criminal history, incarceration history, prior records 
and evaluations in connection with his assessment. Counsel for Perez called Dr. Beaver as a 
witness for the defense at the sentencing hearing held March 31, 2006, in supp01t of his capacity 
for rehabilitation. During that hearing, Dr. Beaver testified that Perez was "very bright" and that, 
while he displayed certain paranoia when he was doing methamphetamine, Perez demonstrated 
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no fo1mal psychiatric problems when he has been clean (from methamphetamine) for a period of 
time. 
Thus, in contrast to Perez's assertion, his psychological condition was addressed in the 
relevant time fran1e and no fitness issues were identified. Petitioner has not demonstrated any 
deficient performance on the part of his trial counsel in this regard, nor has he demonstrated how 
any claimed deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. In contrast to Perez's 
allegations, the court record disproves his claims. 
Failure to Advocate for Adequate Pre~Trial Conditions of Detention 
Petitioner's original prose affidavit set forth allegations about his conditions of 
confinement, but also indicated that those conditions ended prior to his appearing before the 
cow·t to plead guilty on September 13 1 2005. As set forth above, the record of the court 
proceedings reveals that a psychological evaluation of Perez was conducted in connection with 
the sentencing process, and that no psychiatric issues were identified. Perez has not presented 
admissible evidence, which is neither conclusory nor speculative, to demonstrate how his 
attorney's performance was deficient in relation to his conditions of confinement, or how any 
perfmmance on the part of his attorney caused him prejudice in the outcome of the criminal 
cases. [The comt will address separately the allegation regarding how the conditions of 
confinement contributed to the coerciveness of his plea.] 
Utilized Coercive Conditions of Pre-Trial Detention to Force Petitioner to Enter Pleas of 
Guilty 
No supplemental affidavit was filed in support of the Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. However, in reviewing the Petitioner's original prose affidavit, it can be read 
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as contending that his plea was coerced by unsatisfactory pre-trial detention conditions and the 
actions of his attorney. Specifically, Perez said that his lawyer told him that she" (3) .... probably 
could get a deal from the prosecutor. In which included being moved out of X2 unit to unit D-
tank along with dropping a battery assault and persistent violator charge. ( 4) Petitioner was then 
moved out of X-2 tank and no longer subjected to it's (sic) hon'ible living conditions. (5) 
Approximately one (1) week later from the above incident of paragraph 3 Counsel informed 
Petitioner that the prosecution would not drop one (1) of the assault charges nor the persistent 
violator charge and it would be an open sentence. Petitioner stated "I will not take that deal." 
Counsel got mad and irritated .... and [informed him] that he would have to return to X-2 tank. 
As a result of counsel's coercive behavior and threat of Petitioner going back to X-2 tank, 
Petitioner accepted the deal." 
A guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if it is 'voluntary" and "intelligent." Bousley, 
523 U.S. at 618 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). A guilty plea is 
deemed valid when a defendant is advised of the nature and elements of the charges against him 
and the possible punishment and understands that he is waiving his constitutional rights to avoid 
self-incrimination, to confront his accuser, and to have a jury decide his case. Brady, 397 U.S. at 
749. Additionally, to be valid, a plea must not be made based on threats, misrepresentations, or 
improper promises. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56. Perez did not raise the claim of 
involuntary plea on appeal. Having failed to do so, his claim is baned absent a showing of cause 
and prejudice or actual innocence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,622 (1998) 
At the change of plea hearing on September 13, 2005, pursuant to plea negotiations, the 
Defendant plead guilty in Case No. CR-2005-6559 to the offense of Aggravated Battery on a 
Law Enforcement Officer, plus the Pa11 II Persistent Violator enhancement. In Case No. CR-
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2005-3932, Perez also plead guilty to one count of Aggravated Assault (upon the person of 
Suzanne Lawson), plus the Part II Persistent _Yiolator enhancement contained in the Amended 
Information. As pa1t of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved his right to appeal the 
coutt's decision on the Motion to Suppress Evidence in Case No. CR-2005-6559. In exchange 
for the pleas of guilty, the State agreed to dismiss several additional felony charges in Case No. 
CR-2005-3932: (a) Count II, Aggravated Assault upon the person of George W. Norris, in 
violation ofldaho Code 18-901(a orb); 18-905(a); (b) Count III, Aggravated Assault upon the 
person of Kasara R, Stroebel, in violation ofldaho Code 18-901(a orb); 18-905(a); (c) Count IV, 
Unlawful Possession ofa Firearm, in violation ofldaho Code Section 18-3316; and (d) Count V, 
Injury to Child-Felony, upon the person of E.L., nine days old, in violation ofldaho Code 
Section 18-1501(1). Additionally, the State agreed to dismiss four (4) Persistent Violator 
allegations in Part II. 
Petitioner Perez was present when the State advised that there were no underlying 
sentencing agreements in the two cases, other than the State's willingness to dismiss the 
additional charges and persistent violator enhancements in Case No. CR-2005-3932. The comt 
again advised Perez of the maximum penalties for the charges to which he intended to plead 
guilty. The colloquy between the cowt and the Petitioner reveals that he was advised about the 
following: 
(a) The court examined the Petitioner and determined that he was pleading guilty 
because the allegations were true and that no one had forced him to do so; 
(b) The Petitioner was advised of, and indicated that he understood, that a plea of guilty 
would constitute a waiver or giving up of certain rights and privileges, including the 
right to stand trial by jury; the right to confront and cross-examine the State's 
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witnesses in open court; the right to the court's subpoena powers to call witnesses in 
his own behalf; the presumption of innocence and the privilege against self-
incrimination, as well as the right to assert any defenses to the charges to which he 
was pleading guilty, with the exception in Case No. CR-2005-6559, where he 
retained his right to challenge the court's denial of his Motion to Suppress Evidence; 
( c) The comt advised the Petitioner that it was not a patty to any agreements and was 
bound at sentencing only by the maximum possible penalties as fixed by law. 
( d) The court examined the Petitioner and detennined that he had understood the 
discussions which he had had with his attorney; that he was twenty-eight (28) years 
old; that he had completed up to the tenth grade, but that he had received his GED. 
( e) Petitioner indicated to the court that he understood what the choices were in his cases. 
(f) Petitioner also stated that he was satisfied with the representation of his attorney; that 
he had not taken any dlugs or medications in the preceding 24 hours, or any other 
substance that would affect his ability to understand these proceedings. 
(g) The court questioned the Petitioner concerning whether there were any threats or 
promises made to get him to change his pleas to guilty. The Petitioner said that there 
were not. 
(h) The court questioned whether the Petitioner had had adequate time to discuss these 
cases with his attorney. The Petitioner indicated that he had had sufficient time to 
discuss the cases. 
(I ) The court questioned the Petitioner concerning whether he believed that his attomey 
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had done everything that he had expected her to do in these cases. The Petitioner 
advised the court that there was nothing which he had asked his attorney to do that 
she had not done. 
Statements made in open court at the time of a plea carry a strong presumption of verity 
and are entitled to great weight. Citizen v. Hunter, 809 F. 2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1977). Even though that presumption is not 
necessarily an insurmountable barrier to an evidentiary hearing, the "subsequent presentation of 
conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are 
contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 
63, 75 (1977) (citations omitted). 
The court concludes that, on the record before it, Petitioner Perez has failed to present 
specific, admissible facts that are consistent with the actual court record and that support his 
claim that his attorney's performance with regard to his plea was defective, and/or that the 
attorney's performance resulted in prejudice to him. First, although Petitioner contends that the 
State was unwilling to dismiss assault, battery and persistent violator charges, it appears that a 
number of felony charges and persistent violator enhancements were in fact dismissed. Further, 
Petitioner retained the right to challenge the cowt's suppression ruling in Case No. CR-2005-
6559 on appeal. In the cases involving the Petitioner's shooting of the police officer, the State 
made clear that there were no agreements concerning recommendations for an underlying 
sentence, and an accused has no right to a plea bargain. The court also, in more than one 
context, advised the Petitioner that the court was not a party to the negotiations and made no 
promises concerning a sentence. Petitioner Perez, in open court, stated that he was satisfied with 
his attorney's performance and that he was not pressured, coerced, or threatened in any way to 
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accept the plea negotiation, which involved dismissal of numerous felonies and potential 
sentencing enhancements. In fact, Perez told the court that he was pleading guilty because the 
charges were true; that no one was forcing him to plead guilty; that he adequate time to talk to 
his attorney about the charges; that his attorney had done all the things that he would have 
expected her to do in representing him; he stated that there were not things that she had failed to 
do that he had wanted her to do. Petitioner's contentions about his detention conditions were 
conclusory, were unclear concerning the time frame relative to the plea, and did not demonstrate 
that the conditions were in any way inhumane or inappropriate considering the need to protect 
him within the jail population because of his prior history, gang affiliation, the nature of his 
charges, his potential escape risk (as a result'of fleeing to Nevada and being apprehended there), 
statements attributed to him that he may take further action to protect himself if captured, etc. 
Perez has not raised a factual issue that even if his counsel had made unprofessional e1rnrs in the 
context of discussing the plea options with him, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. This is especially hue since the sentence in Case No. CR-2005-3932 ran concmTent 
with the sentence in Case No. CR-2005-6559, where he expressed an intent to plead guilty and to 
challenge the court's suppression ruling on appeal. 
FaUure to Research and Present Arguments on Appeal as Directed by PeUtioner 
The record contains no specific facts in support of the allegation that Perez's appellate 
counsel was ineffective. Again, Petitioner Perez has offered only a general conclusory 
allegation, unsuppo11ed by any admissible evidence identifying what alleged research and legally 
cognizable arguments that he directed appellate counsel to present that were not presented. The 
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact with regard to the alleged 
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deficient performance of appellate counsel, and he has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of 
material fact with the regard to how he was allegedly prejudiced by the performance of appellate 
counsel. 
ORDER 
On the grounds and for the reasons stated, the court does hereby grant the State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906( c ), and does hereby 
dismiss this action with prejudice. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 6?/1J-::-3,, AL day of April, 2011. 
a ~ Juneal~(? District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been fo1warded to 
the following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse 
basket; or by facsimile copy: 
Mimurn Law Office, PLLC 
Canyon County Public Defender 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Bryan F, Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Dated this----=---- day of ff[ 9!p 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
Clerk of the Cow1 
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